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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between hard currency and financial
development. It creates four different series of hard currency based on different sets of data.
The results of the paper suggest that indeed financial development and the hardness of
currencies are highly correlated. However, we find that the relationship from currency
hardness to financial development is fully captured by macro variables that represent overall
macroeconomic stability. This suggest that having a hard currency is not a pre-condition for
financial development but rather establishing a macroeconomic stable environment.
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The debate on the effect of exchange regimes on economic performance has reached a
new level. In the past, the focus was on the effect of different exchange regimes on growth,
inflation and, after the Asian currency crises, on financial fragility.
2 More recently, the
emphasis is, perhaps, on a deeper problem. Given the existence of incompleteness in financial
markets, most developing countries suffer from an “original sin,” they cannot use their
currency to borrow abroad or to borrow long term, even domestically.
3 This implies that
financial fragility is unavoidable because domestic investments will have either a currency
mismatch or a maturity mismatch. It follows that any exchange regime, fixed or floating, is
problematic. The only solution, according to some, is to have no exchange rate. That is,
developing countries should abolish their domestic “weak” currencies and adopt the dollar or
any other “hard currency.”
This line of argument raises a few interesting questions. Why is that developing
countries have the “original sin” and can only borrow domestically and short term? Or, in
other words, why developing countries have weak currencies? Is there any other way to
establish a hard currency without resorting to the extreme solution to substitute all domestic
currencies for a few international hard currencies? In addition, there are a set of questions on
relationship between hard currency and financial development. Does establishing a hard
currency induce more credit in domestic currency, in particular, long term?
This paper is an attempt to address these questions using available cross-country
information on different currencies (the initial sample has 162 countries during 1989-1998).
There are at least two issues that arise immediate once the questions are posed seriously. First,
there is no established definition of what constitutes a hard currency. There are at least two
different definitions of a hard currency. A stricter definition associates a hard currency with
its use as international mean of payments and reserve value. Few currencies have the privilege
to be a hard currency under this definition, probably only the dollar, the Euro, the Yen, and
some other European currencies. The second definition is broader than the first. A currency is
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hard when it denominates long term nominal contracts and allows long term financial markets
to be developed. This definition has the advantage of identifying the welfare gains that a hard
currency provides. There are, obviously, more countries under this broad definition than under
the narrow definition. The Australian dollar, the Swedish Krona and the New Zealand dollar
immediately come to mind as examples of hard currencies under the broad definition. The
definition, however, is strict enough to exclude the majority of developing countries’
currencies. One could think of the two definitions of hard currency as a part of the same
process where initially long term financial markets are formed domestically and subsequently,
if the world is relatively scarce in hard currencies, the currency is used internationally (as an
export of “hard currency services”).
The paper dedicates considerable effort to construct four empirical series (and two
additional slightly modified ones), counterparts to the definitions above. Next section
summarizes the different definitions and sections III – VI describes how we constructed the
series.
The second issue is how to address the fact that hard currency and financial
development are both endogenous variables. There is no perfect answer to this issue and the
answer provided in this paper is no exception. In order to overcome the problem we
performed exercises in the extreme cases and qualified our conclusions based on these results.
First, we gave financial development the highest chance to explain as much as possible of the
hard currency indices. Then, we invert the procedure and gave hard currency the highest
chance to explain financial development. In the exercises we control for important
macroeconomic determinants of both financial development and hard currency. For example,
macroeconomic stability is certainly an important determinant since uncertainty regarding
inflation, or other macroeconomic variables, seems to prevent markets to be formed. Other
determinants may include trade and financial openness. Section VII and VIII address this
mutual relationship and the effect of macroeconomic variables.
The results of the paper suggest that indeed financial development and the hardness of
currencies are highly correlated. However, we find that the relationship from the hardness of
the currency to financial development is fully captured by macro variables that represent
overall macroeconomic stability. Therefore, if the currency regime has a bear on the5
development of the financial sector it passes through establishing a stable macroeconomic
environment (measured for example by low and stable inflation and real interest rates). In this
regard, if there is an “original sin,” it is the macroeconomic instability that plagues developing
countries.
II. What is Hard Currency? Empirical Estimates and Data Used.
There is no clear definition of what exactly is hard currency. At a first glance, the
“hardness” of a currency could be defined as the willingness of international agents to hold
the currency, as measured by its actual use in cross border financial positions. This is indeed a
natural definition of hard currency, but definitely a very restrictive one, since few currencies
would classify as such. We think of this definition as the "strong form of hard currency"
(SHC).
A second definition uses the same principle, i.e., the willingness of international
agents to hold the currency, but tries to incorporate more hard currencies into the sample
using a more continuous definition of hardness. The problem, obviously, is how to implement
this definition empirically. We will come back to this point later in the paper. We denote this
definition as the "weak form of hard currency" (WHC).
A third definition of hard currency is the willingness to use domestic currency in long
term contracts. Its main problem, as will be argued below, is that by construction it is highly
correlated with the degree of financial development of the country. In what follows, we refer
to this definition as the "financial form of hard currency" (FHC or using a slightly different
methodology, FHC_OW).
Finally, the last definition of hard currency defines the hardness of the country in
proportion to the perceived risk of the currency as embedded in the relative ratings of
domestic and foreign currency sovereign debt. We denominated this variable the Credit
Rating definition of Hard Currency (CRHC).6
A good part of the effort involved in the paper was dedicated to the construction of the
empirical counterparts of the definitions above. The next four sections explain in great amount
of detail the procedures to create the hard currency series. Table A1 in the appendix lists all
definitions of hard currency.
The database used in the paper was constructed using a sample of 162 countries
covering the period 1989-1998 in an annual basis.  All the regressions are cross-section where
the individual observations correspond to the period average (or, alternatively, the standard
deviation).
The correlation between the different hard currency series is shown in Table 1.
Although there is a high correlation between the series, it is far less than one, which
potentially can provide different information.
Table 1
FHC FHC_OW HC WHC CRHC
FHC 1.00 0.611 0.951 0.976 0.543
FHC_OW 1.00 0.608 0.600 0.324
HC 1.00 0.780 0.414
WHC 1.00 0.480
CRHC 1.00
III. Strong definition of Hard Currency
We constructed the Strong Hard Currency (SHC) definition using information from
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). In order to qualify as SHC a currency has to be
“significantly used" by BIS reporting banks in cross border positions. In practice
“significantly used” meant that the currency had to be reported separately in the currency
breakdown of cross border positions published in the quarterly report of the BIS. Less than 10
percent of all positions held are not reported separately and is composed by the sum of a large
number of currencies used in small amounts, usually for idiosyncratic reasons.
This definition implied, as it should be expected, that the “hard currencies” worldwide
held are those of the G7 countries (with the exception of Canada) and a couple of other
western European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland,7
U.K., Japan, and the US). We created a dummy series assigning the value of one to a SHC
country and zero otherwise.
It is useful at this time to summarize some of the characteristics of a stable currency
that are expected to be correlated with the strong hard currencies definition. The theoretical
literature provides several channels through which country characteristics might influence the
willingness to hold a currency; (i) the opportunity cost as measured by the average of the
inflation and real interest rate; (ii) the volatility of these variables; (iii) the openness of the
country and the financial sector, (iv) the level of per capita income (GDP) and; (v) the
development of the financial sector. In the rest of this section we report the relationships
between these variables and our definition of SHC.
An increase in the opportunity cost of holding money, through an increase in the
average inflation or real interest rate, should decrease the willingness to hold the currency,
other things equal. This principle bases the original inventory models of holding currency
(Miller and Orr 1966) through the most current ones (White 1999).
Table 2 shows the result of a series of Probit regressions. First, it shows the
relationship between the inflation rate, real interest rate and Strong Hard Currency
(regressions I, II and III). The left-hand side is our SHC dummy and the right hand side
variable is either the average inflation for each country between 1989 to 1998 or the average
real interest rate for the same period or both. We first run the regressions separately, and then
we introduce the three of them at once, because it could be the case that realized ex-post real
rates and inflation are highly correlated.
4
As can be seen in regression I, there is a very important relationship between SHC and
inflation. The expected sign goes in the right direction and it is highly statistically significant.
Moreover, using the McFadden R-square the average inflation rate explains up to 1/3 of the
decision of investors to hold the currency. When the realized real interest rate is used as the
only right hand side variable, the estimates are not significant and the explanatory power is
poor. Again, the sign goes in the right direction. Finally, in regression III inflation and interest
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rates are introduced in the right hand side. Note that the signs continue to be in the right
direction and the coefficients are both significant.
The uncertainty related to holding a currency is proportional to the volatility of its real
value that could be proxied by the volatility of inflation. In analogy with the corporate finance
literature, holding a currency could be interpreted as holding a risk free bond, paying the
inverse of the average inflation, plus selling a put option. An increase in the volatility of the
underlying price (the inflation rate) implies an increase in the value of the option, and
therefore, a decrease in the implied value of the currency. Therefore, an increase in the
variance of the inflation rate should decrease the willingness to hold a currency. Equation IV
in Table I shows that this is indeed the case. The effect of inflation volatility on inflation is
negative and significant. In fact, the inflation's volatility series contributes to explain more
than 1/3 of the decision to holding a currency.
There may be a relationship between openness and SHC. In principle there are two
opposing effects. On one hand, a more open economy (in trade) is more vulnerable to external
shocks, and therefore, could destabilize the currency and reduce its demand. On the other
hand, as shown by Romer (1993), openness could put a check on inflation and reduce
currency instability. Openness is proxied here as the average exports plus imports expressed
as a proportion of GDP.
The two effects are reflected in our data. First, when openness is introduced by itself
the effect is negative, although not statistically significant (as shown in equation V in Table 2)
However, when it is interacted with inflation, in equation VI, the relationship is highly
negative and significant.
The level of income of the country can be a measure of the implicit insurance of the
stability of a currency. In other words, poor countries cannot offer the same type of guarantee
of currency stability that a rich country can tender. Therefore, one should expect a positive
correlation between GDP level and the hardness of the currency. In fact, the level of GDP is
highly correlated with the hardness of the currency. In fact, it almost explains 60 percent of
the variation (see equation VII).9
Finally, one should expect that the higher the degree of financial development the more
stable the currency will be and the higher the probability of being a SHC. We measure the
degree of development of the financial sector as the ratio between the total private credit and
M1, weighted by the size of total private credit expressed as a proportion of GDP.  Table 2,
equation VIII, shows that the coefficient is positive and significant. The larger is the financial
sector, the larger the likelihood of holding the currency.
An alternative measure is to compute the implied long-term credit in the banking
sector measured as a proportion of M1.
5  As can be seen from comparing the McFadden R-
squares of both regressions, the explanatory power of the long-term development of the
financial sector is more important than the size of the financial sector.
It is important to mention that there is a very large literature that argues the reverse
causality. 
6 In other words, that a precondition for a healthy banking and financial sector is the
existence of a relatively hard currency. In fact, the result from the previous regression can
indeed be the outcome of reverse causality. We come back to this issue later in the paper.
It is useful to present all these channels interacting together to determine hard
currency. Since there is an issue regarding the causality of the relationship between financial
sector development and hard currency, we will leave out this variable at this first pass on the
problem. In fact, one should interpret the overall regression as a reduced form in which we are
interested in maximizing the predictable power of the right hand side variables.
The results are shown in regression X, in Table 2.  Two remarks are in order. First,
note that the signs of all the coefficients behave as expected. Second, the predicted power of
the regression is quite high, 73 percent of the variation. And finally, the coefficients across
specifications are remarkably stable (with the exception of inflation -average and volatility-
coefficients).
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6 Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann 1999.Table 2: Strong Hard Currency-Probit Regressions
(Dependent Variable: Strong Hard Currency)
Regression number I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
0.03 -1.54 1.43 0.24 -1.18 1.54 -7.65 -4.40 -4.04 5.05
Constant (0.941) (0.000) (0.105) (0.609) (0.001) (0.039) (0.0006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.233)
-0.34 -0.42 -0.41 -1.26
Average inflation (0.002) (0.0042) (0.0002) (0.033)
-0.78 -2.19
Inflation volatility (0.003) (0.197)
-0.002 -0.17 -0.33
Real interest rates (0.498) (0.032) (0.210)
-0.01 -0.02 -0.02




Private Credit/ M1 (0.018)
1.68
Long Term Credit/M1 (0.026)
 McFadden R-squared 0.304 0.000 0.375 0.356 0.027 0.426 0.593 0.108 0.270 0.733
Note: P-value in parenthesis; definition of variables in the appendix. Cross-section regression using all countries with data available. Standard errors are computed to have robust
covariance estimates using the Huber/White method.IV. Weak Definition of Hard Currency
The Weak Hard Currency (WHC) definition is trickier to construct. The decision to
use a currency for international trade or to hold in cross border financial positions is not a
continuos variable. Since there are externalities in the use of a common currency as a unit of
account or a store of value the natural equilibrium is the use of a limited number of currencies.
There may exist other currencies with desirable properties that the agents would be willing to
hold but those currencies were crowded out from international use. In order to get a grip on
the willingness to use a currency we correlate the characteristics of a stable currency with the
decision to use a currency internationally (our observed SHC currencies) in a Probit model.
We construct the WHC definition by assigning to each country the predicted value of this
Probit model regression. This procedure will give us a more continuos hard currency variable.
The fitted values are shown in Table A1 (in the appendix). It is possible to compare
the predicted value of the model with the actual series of hard currency (comparing WHC
with SHC). Assuming the cutoff occurs at 0.20 the mode predicts the all the strong hard
currencies without mistake, and it only over-predicts 3 out of 119 of the other currencies.
Table 3: Comparing the predicted value with SHC
           Estimated Equation Constant Probability
Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total
P(Dep=1)<=C 116 0 116 119 6 125
P(Dep=1)>C 3 6 9 0 0 0
Total 119 6 125 119 6 125
Correct 116 6 122 119 0 119
% Correct 97.48 100.00 97.60 100.00 0.00 95.20
% Incorrect 2.52 0.00 2.40 0.00 100.00 4.80
Total Gain* -2.52 100.00 2.40
Percent Gain** NA 100.00 50.0012
V. Financial definition of hard currencies
The third definition of hard currency is related to the existence of long term contracts
denominated in domestic currency. This measure is hard to construct in practice given that
information about the long term financing is not readily available for a large number of
countries. In order to deal with this problem we take a short cut and construct proxies for the
degree of development of the financial sector. We use three variables (the last two obtained
from the BIS): (i) The size of the private credit measured as a proportion of M1 (cpriv_m1),
(ii) the proportion of domestic currency lending by foreign banks as a proportion of GDP
(lc_posit), and (iii) the proportion of total cross border lending as a proportion of GDP
(tot_posit). Index series are constructed for each variable.
 The first index captures the notion that total private credit, as a proportion of liquid
assets, should be proportional to the proportion of long term credit available in the economy.
The index is constructed as follows:
[ ] ) 1 _ ( * 5 . 1 ) 1 _ ( 1 _ 1 1 _ _ m cpriv stdev m cpriv mean m cpriv m cpriv index + > =
where the index assumes the value of 1 out when the variable assumes extreme values as
expressed by the mean plus 1.5 times the standard deviation. This configuration captures a
little bit less than 7 percent of the cases (1.3 would capture around 10 percent of the cases and
the results are qualitatively the same). We should expect this index to be positively correlated
to the hardness of a currency.
The second index looks at lending in domestic currency extended by foreign banks as
a proportion of GDP.  The idea is that the larger the magnitude of domestic lending by foreign
banks the stronger is the currency. Therefore, the following index is constructed:
[ ]
[ ] ) _ ( * 5 . 1 ) _ ( _ 1
) _ ( * 5 . 1 ) _ ( _ 1 _ _
posit lc stdev posit lc mean posit lc
posit lc stdev posit lc mean posit lc posit lc index
+ > +
- < - =13
The index takes values of {-1,0,1} where the lower the number of the index the lower
is the strength of the currency. Note that the procedure to define the index indicate that the
lowest 10 percent of the countries with lc_posit will have a negative coefficient, the highest
10 percent will have a one and the remaining 80 percent will get a zero. The intuition is that a
very small proportion of loans extended in domestic credit indicates that the currency is weak.
Equivalently, we construct the third index using the notion that the larger is the
proportion of foreign loans (large total cross border positions) the more fragile is the currency
in question. A positive index indicates a weak currency:
[ ]
[ ] ) _ ( * 5 . 1 ) _ ( _ 1
) _ ( * 5 . 1 ) _ ( _ 1 _ _
posit tot stdev posit tot mean posit tot
posit tot stdev posit tot mean posit tot posit tot index
+ > +
- < - =
With these indices at hand, we first show the relationship between these indices and
the previous definitions of strong currency. Instead of running a Probit regression (which will
be perfectly predicted by just assigning the index_lc_posit>2) we just report the correlation
between this indices and the SHC definition:
Table 4:
SHC INDEX_CPRIV_M1 INDEX_LC_POSIT INDEX_TOT_POSIT
SHC 1.000 0.457 0.089 -0.038
INDEX_CPRIV_M1 1.000 0.057 -0.024
INDEX_LC_POSIT 1.000 -0.136
INDEX_TOT_POSIT 1.000
Similarly for the weak hard currency definition:
Table 5:
W_HC INDEX_CPRIV_M1 INDEX_LC_POSIT INDEX_TOT_POSIT
W_HC 1.000 0.596 0.083 -0.039
INDEX_CPRIV_M1 1.000 0.057 -0.024
INDEX_LC_POSIT 1.000 -0.136
INDEX_TOT_POSIT 1.000
The correlations between the indices and our previous definitions of hard currency are
strong only with respect to the private credit index.14
The second step is to construct a single series of Financial Hard Currency (FHC) using
the indices created above. Two procedures are used to define the FHC. First, we define the
series using the weights that maximize the correlation with the weak definition of hard
currency. We call this definition the "optimal weights". Running a Tobit we find the following
results:
Table 6: Dependent Variable - Hard Currency
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -0.11 0.0433 -2.62 0.009
Index_TOT_Posit*TOT_Posit -0.001 0.0009 -1.37 0.172
Index_LC_Posit*LC_Posit 0.007 0.0027 2.42 0.016
Index_Cpriv_M1*Cpriv_M1 0.129 0.0551 2.33 0.020
R-squared 0.362
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The second procedure is to estimate the FHC series as the predicted value of a
regression of the weak hard currency (WHC) series using all the macro variables and our
three indices.  This is similar to the procedure used to define the weak hard currency using the
SHC series. This definition is simply called the FHC. The results of the regression are as
follows:
Table 7: Dependent Variable - Hard Currency
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C 0.1404 0.0458 3.07 0.002
INFLATION_AV 0.0049 0.0016 2.92 0.004
INTEREST_AV -0.0030 0.0018 -1.63 0.104
INFLATION_SD -0.0218 0.0080 -2.72 0.007
INTEREST_SD -0.0408 0.0164 -2.48 0.013
OPEN 0.0008 0.0004 -1.89 0.059
GDP 3.08E-05 0.0004 4.62 0.000
LC_POSIT*INDEX_L
C_POSIT -0.0030 0.0014 -2.17 0.030
TOT_POSIT*INDEX_
TOT_POSIT 0.0001 0.0002 0.54 0.590
CPRIV_M1*INDEX_C
PRIV_M1 0.0082 0.0380 0.22 0.828
R-squared 0.94915
The predicted values from this regression imply, then, the financial measure of
hardness of the currency (FHC) shown in Table A1 in the appendix.
VI. Credit Rating Definition of Hard Currency
Another way we measure the hardness of a currency is through the use of the
information provided by credit ratings as published by Standard and Poors (S&P). Some
countries, in particular developing countries, tend to have better ratings on their local currency
denominated instruments than on their foreign currency denominated ones. The reasoning
provided by S&P is that it is far easier for governments to fulfill obligations in the currency
that they are allowed to print. In other words, the right to inflate away the debt reduces, ceteris
paribus, the probability of default. The credit agency, therefore, implicitly estimates the
probability that a country will resort to inflationary finance to liquify its debt. The paper uses
the relative ratings on domestic and foreign currency sovereign debt as a measure of the
weakness of several domestic currencies.
The S&P classification contains 23 categories for long-term credit instruments and 9
for short-term ones for both foreign and domestic currency denominated debt. In order to
construct our credit rating based measures of hardness; the first step was to transform the S&P
scales (based in letters) into numerical scales. We assigned a number for each category,
beginning with 1 for D (Default, the worst category in both scales) and finishing in 23 for
AAA (the best category in the long-term instruments classification) and 9 for A1+ (the best
category in the short-term instruments classification), for both foreign and local-currency
denominated instruments. The second step was to calculate the ratio between the numerical
indexes of foreign and local currency instruments for both short (CRHC_short) and long
(CRHC_long) term, where the higher the index the harder is the currency.
In order to compare this alternative with our previous HC definition, we estimate a
binary probit with HC as the dependent variable and our credit ratings based measures of
hardness on the right side. The results are shown in Table 8. Observe that in both cases we
obtained, as expected, positive and statistically significant estimates for the coefficients of our
measures of hardness. Additionally, we estimate a binary probit with HC as the dependent
variable using both CRHC_short AND CRHC_long and other variables as explanatory16
variables. Note that CRHC_long have the right signal and it is statistically significant at the
10% level but, surprisingly, CRHC_short appears with the wrong sign.
Finally, we ran OLS regressions for each measure (CRHC_short and CRHC_long) on
inflation, real interest rates, their respective volatilities, openness and per capita income. Table
9 shows the results. Observe that the explanatory power of the variables (measured by the R2)
is higher in the CRHC_short regression than in the CRHC_long one.
Table 8: Dependent Variable HC







6.32 -60.52 CRHC_short (0.013) (0.087)
9.04 73.58 CRHC_long (0.005) (0.099)
R-Squared 0.253 0.150 0.774
Notes: P- Value in Parenthesis; definitions of variables in appendix. Cross-section regression using all countries with data available.
Table 9
CRHC_short CRHC_long
0.808 0.820 Constant (0.000) (0.000)
-0.0004 0.0001 Inflation_AV (0.165) (0.707)
0.001 -0.0004 Interest_AV (0.281) (0.783)
0.0003 -8.99E-05 Inflation_SD (0.061) (0.675)
-0.0002 0.0006 Interest_SD (0.720) (0.535)
0.0001 0.0002 Openness (0.497) (0.462)
5.79E-06 6.37E-06 GDP (0.000) (0.000)
R-Squared 0.43 0.3117
VII. Financial Development and Hard Currency
In this section, we tackle the question whether financial development help determine
the hardness of the currency. The problem here is the existence of the reverse causality, the
alleged effect of hard currency on the development of the financial sector. In fact, according
to one of our definitions, hard currency is defined as the existence of long term financing in
the currency. The latter is also a measure of the development of the financial sector. Because
there is a high correlation between financial sector development and our macro economic
variables, running an overall Probit regression using all the variables is not ideal. Instead we
proceed using a two step approach.
First, we run a regression in which only a constant and financial development are used
to explain hard currency. Second, we take the residuals from the first step and study how
much is explained by inflation, interest rates, etc. In this way, since financial development
depends on the same macro variables as hard currencies, the second step will measure how
much the macro variables explain the innovations after we have controlled for financial
development.
 Using this two step procedure we are maximizing the explanatory power of financial
development. Therefore, if the macro variables are still significant in the second step, we can
indeed conclude that our measure of hard currency is capturing something beyond the usual
correlation between financial development and the hardness of the currency. Second and more
importantly, we would be able to conclude what factors are more important in describing the
hardness of currencies, even after controlling for financial development. We follow this
procedure with all the definitions of hard currencies.1. Strong definition of hard currency and financial development
The first step is to run a Probit regression where the dependent variable is SHC and the
explanatory variable is total private credit as a proportion of M1.
7 The specification is given
by:
{ } 0 Pr > + = Credit c shc a ,
and the results are presented in Table 10.
Taking the residuals from the Probit regression we estimate the following equation:
e + n + h + g + b + a + = GDP Open sd _ Inflation av _ Interest av _ Inflation c credit _ hc _ resid
The results are presented in Table 11. Note that in this residual regression, the
coefficients of average interest rate, openness?, and GDP are statistically different from zero
and with the correct sign. In conclusion, even after we have controlled for financial
development, interest rate, openness, and GDP still have explanatory power. Inflation, who
was highly significant before, is fully captured by the first step.
2. Weak definition of hard currency and financial development
We repeat the procedure from the previous section using our measure of weak hard
currency (WHC). Remember that WHC is not a {0,1} variable because it reflects the
likelihood of holding the currency. Thus, instead of running a Probit regression we use a Tobit
specification.
The results in Tables 10 and 11 show that it is also the case that GDP and openness
continue to be significant in the determination of the hardness of the currency, after we have
controlled for financial development. In fact, it should not be surprising that after we have
controlled for financial development, inflation, interest rates, and its volatility have no further
explanatory power in the computation of the hardness of the currency.
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same results.3. Financial definition of hard currency and financial development
We repeat the exercise with our financial definitions of hard currency. Here we have
two definitions; thus each of them is analyzed separately. We estimate the effect of FHC using
a Tobit specification, given that the index is censored at 0 and 1, and we run an OLS
specification for the optimal weight index FHC_OW.
The results are shown in Table 10. Total private credit and a constant explain more
than 40 percent of the variation of the FHC index and almost 50 percent of the variation of the
FHC_OW index. The next step is to take the residuals from each of the regressions and verify
the remaining explanatory power of the macro variables. We compare the coefficients with
the ones estimated from a normal regression between financial hard currency and private
credit as a ratio of M1.
The results are shown in Table 11. For the FHC definition, the residual and non-
residual coefficients estimates are very similar. In fact it is not possible to reject the
hypothesis that they are the same across specifications. For the FHC_OW, there are indeed
important changes in the coefficients, at least in their significance. When financial
development is not taken into account GDP and inflation are the most important explanatory
variables. When the development of the financial sector is taken into account only openness
has the right sign and is significant (the coefficient of interest_av is significant, but it has the
wrong sign). However, it is important to highlight that it is not possible to reject the
hypothesis that the estimates are the same across specifications.
Another exercise to determine the relationship between financial sector development
and these two indices is to do the opposite: take the residuals from the macro variable
regression and determine the remaining explanatory power of the financial sector variable.
The results are shown in Tables 12. For the FHC  index, note that the private credit has no
explanatory power on the residual after macro variables have been included (R squared of
0.017). This should be contrasted with the previous results where a constant and private credit
explain 43 percent of the variation of FHC with a very significant coefficient.  Similarly, for20
the optimal weighting financial definition, FHC_OW, there is no remaining explanatory
power to the financial sector development variable when the regression is run on the residuals.
A final exercise is to include all the variables in the same regression and determine the
importance of financial development. The results are shown in Table 13.  It is important to
note that when FHC is estimated (using a Tobit regression) financial development is
insignificant. Similar results are obtained when the FHC_OW  variable is used.
4.  Credit Rating of hard currency and financial development
We repeated the exercises above for the credit rating definition of hard currency. First,
we estimate the OLS regression of CRHC_Long (alternatively, CRHC_Short) on a constant
and CPRIV_M1 and save the residual series. Then we estimate a second OLS regression of
these residuals on inflation and real interest rates, their respective volatilities, openness and
per capita income. The results are shown in Tables 10 and 11. Observe that in both cases GDP
was the most important explanatory variable, even after controlling for private credit as a
proportion of GDP in the first-step regressions.
Again we reverted the order of the variables in our two-step strategy. First we ran OLS
regressions of each credit rating based measure on the macro variables and saved the
residuals. Then we ran OLS regressions of these residuals on private credit over M1. The
results are shown in Tables 12. Again the private credit variable is insignificant once the other
macroeconomic variables are taken into account.
Finally, we estimate OLS regressions of our credit rating based measures of hardness
on the macro variables (inflation, real interest rates, their respective volatilities, openness and
GDP) plus a measure of financial development (priv/m1). The results are shown in Table 13.
Again, the variable private credit over M1 seems to loose significance once other
macroeconomic variables are taken into account.
In conclusion, in this section we adopted a critical view on the relationship between
hard currency and financial development, given the risk of a spurious correlation. Given that
no good exclusion restriction is acceptable, in order to test for spurious correlation, we21
investigated the extreme positions. First, we gave financial development the highest chance to
explain as much as possible of the hard currency indices. We took the residuals from those
regressions and verified the remaining explanatory power of the other macro variables. As it
was argued, in most of the cases, the coefficients in these regressions are similar to the ones
obtained when the first step was not performed. Second, we gave the macro variables the best
chance to explain the index. When we correlated the residuals of these regressions using the
financial development measure we found no relationship. Finally we run the pooled
regressions and indicate that financial development is insignificant to explain hard currency,
once other macro variables are taken into account. In other words, it is possible to argue that
the correlation between financial development and hard currency is due to the fact
macroeconomic stability is associated with both and not because of any direct effect of
financial development on the hardness of the currency.Table 10:
HC WHC FHC FHC_OW CRHC_LONG CRHC_SHORT
Constant -2.34 -0.36 -0.10 -0.07 0.85 0.86
(0.000) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Private 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.01
Credit/M1 (0.007) (0.012) 0.000 (0.001) (0.042) (0.017)
R-squared 0.24 -0.038 0.435 0.486 0.076 0.110
Notes: P-Value in Parenthesis; definition of variables in appendix. Cross-section regression using all countries with data available.
Table 11: Regressions of Residuals of Hard Currency after controlling for Financial
Development






0.0435 -0.025 -0.035 -0.012 0.015 -0.039 -0.047 -0.045 Constant (0.301) (0.276) (0.062) (0.412) (0.417) (0.005) (0.076) (0.209)
-0.0001 1.81E-05 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0006 -2.35E-05 Average Inflation (0.154) (0.522) (0.000) (0.005) (0.635) (0.007) (0.100) (0.963)
-0.0008 -1.16E-07 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0010 -0.0008 Average Interest
Rates (0.117) (0.318) (0.003) (0.162) (0.682) (0.107) (0.410) (0.596)
6.61E-05 0.0022 0.0006 0.0002 3.10E-05 -0.0004 0.0003 3.93E-06 Inflation
Volatility (0.266) (0.477) (0.000) (0.015) (0.763) (0.001) (0.036) (0.987)
0.0029 0.0025 0.0026 0.0013 1.51E-05 0.0012 Interest Rate
Volatility (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.213) (0.987) (0.306)
-0.001 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0004 -1.07E-05 -6.65E-05 Openness (0.044) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.092) (0.963) (0.840)
1.16E-05 1.27E-05 1.85E-05 3.22E-05 5.13E-06 1.83E-05 4.39E-06 4.85E-06 GDP (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.326) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011)
R-Squared 0.237 0.421 0.823 0.947 0.299 0.719 0.331 0.163
Notes: P-Value in Parenthesis; definition of variables in appendix. Cross-section regression using all countries with data available.Table 12: Residual Regressions of Hard Currency after controlling for
other macroeconomic variables
FHC FHC_OW CRHC-Long CRHC_Short
Constant -0.005 -0.01 -0.008 -0.012
(0.523) (0.551) (0.517) (0.508)
Private 0.004 0.01 0.002 0.002
Credit/M1 (0.337) (0.370) (0.478) (0.621)
R-Squared 0.017 0.015 0.006 0.004
Notes: P-Value in Parenthesis; definition of variables in appendix. Cross-section regression using all countries with data
available.
Table 13: Overall Regression
FHC FHC_OW CRHC_Long CRHC_Short
0,055 -0,043 0,806 0,817 Constant (0,017) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000)
-7.04E-05 0,0005 -0,0005 0,0001 Average Inflation (0,920) (0,106) (0,154) (0,830)
-0,0002 0,0004 0,0011 -0,0006 Average Interest
Rates (0,817) (0,322) (0,340) (0,708)
-0,002 -0,0002 0,0003 -5.80E-05 Inflation Volatility (0,146) (0,051) (0,061) (0,806)
-0,004 0,0017 -0,0001 0,0009 Interest Rates
Volatility (0,150) (0,098) (0,848) (0,448)
-0,0009 -0,0005 8.77E-05 0,0001 Openness (0,000) (0,028) (0,721) (0,743)
2.96E-05 1.44E-05 5.02E-06 5.60E-06 GDP (0,000) (0,007) (0,001) (0,004)
0,007 0,024 0,0037 0,004 Private Credit/M1 (0,336) (0,129) (0,442) (0,513)
R-Squared 0,977 0,732 0,397 0,281
Notes: P- Value in Parenthesis; definitions of variables in appendix. Cross-Section regression
using all countries with data available.24
VIII. Hard Currency and Financial Development
In this section we are interested on the effect of hard currency on financial
development. Three variables measuring financial development are studied: private credit as a
proportion of M1, total credit as a proportion of M1, and long term credit as a proportion of
M1.
In this case because the financial development variables are not limited, we can run
the test by simply adding the hard currency measures to the explanatory variables. The idea of
the exercise is to compare the regressions with and without the measure of hardness. The
results for private credit are shown in Tables 14. First, note that in the regression without
including hard currency (first column), the most important explanatory variables are the
average interest rate and the level of income. The former gives incentive for banks to take
advantage of a higher spread over M1 and the latter increases the demand for credit. Second,
note that the inclusion of the strong hard currency, weak hard currency or credit rating hard
currency measures do not affect the significance nor the estimates of the interest and GDP
coefficients. The numbers are almost numerically identical. This should cast some doubts on
the causality from hard currencies to financial development.
However, when the financial hard currency definitions are included in the regressions
several changes occur.  First the overall explanatory power of the regressions is higher. This
result should have been expected given that the variable on the left-hand side was used to
construct the variables in the right hand side. Second, it is the case that the coefficients on
inflation, interest, inflation variance, interest variance, and openness are stable to the inclusion
of the hard currency indices. The coefficient on the GDP changes only when FHC is used.
Similar results are obtained if total credit as a proportion of GDP is used as dependent
variable (Table 15). The inclusion of hard currency measures does not seem to explain the
degree of financial development.
One could argue that the previous regressions did not give a fair chance to the
hardness of the currency to explain financial development. Therefore, the next exercise is to25
repeat the methodology used in the previous section. The first step is to project financial
development on the hardness of the currency and then run the second step regression. The
results are shown in Tables 16 and 17.
Note that the significance of the interest rate and GDP remain the same when we
controlled for hard currency using HC, WHC and FHC. In fact, the coefficients are not
statistically different from the non-residual regression. This reinforces the result that the hard
currency measures do not have an effect on financial development beyond the observed effect
of macroeconomic variables.
In sum, this section showed that the hardness of the currency does not provide
additional information on the development of the financial sector that is not already included
in other country characteristics. The coefficients on the hard currency definitions are not
significant in the overall regressions. In addition, the coefficients of all the other variables
remained equally significant and almost unchanged once we included our hard currency
definitions.  Not even in the case where the first step of the regression maximized the
explanatory power of the hard currency definitions, the other variables lost their explanatory
power.26
Table 14 – Dependent Variable Private Credit /  M1
-0.095 -0.133 -0.112 0.200 0.224 -2.779 Constant (0.873) (0.824) (0.849) (0.419) (0.381) (0.479)
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.009 0.015 Average
Inflation (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012) (0.194)
0.016 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.023 Average
Interest Rate (0.021) (0.013) (0.015) (0.024) (0.115) (0.535)
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 Inflation
Volatility (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.176)
-0.026 -0.028 -0.027 -0.024 -0.017 -0.032 Interest Rate
Volatility (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.043) (0.147) (0.254)
0.008 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.016 Openness (0.226) (0.159) (0.169) (0.040) (0.068) (0.025)






R-Squared 0.363 0.377 0.365 0.691 0.689 0.316
Note: P-Value in parenthesis; Definitions of Variables are expressed in the appendix. Cross-Section regression
using all countries with data available.27
Table 15 : Dependent Variable Total Credit/M1
0.08 0.03 0.05 -1.00 -0.95 0.87 Constant (0.908) (0.964) (0.941) (0.465) (0.496) (0.823)
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 Average
Inflation (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.107) (0.000)
0.004 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 Average
Interest Rate (0.869) (0.808) (0.830) (0.285) (0.187) (0.823)
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 Inflation
Volatility (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.010) (0.068) 0.000
-0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.03 Interest Rate
Volatility (0.140) (0.138) (0.141) (0.851) (0.460) (0.217)
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 Openness (0.144) (0.113) (0.131) (0.168) (0.176) (0.447)






R-Squared 0.363 0.371 0.366 0.445 0.437 0.299
Note: P-Value in parenthesis; Definitions of Variables are expressed in the appendix. Cross-Section regression
using all countries with data available.28
Table 16 : Dependent Variable Private credit/  M1






R-Square 0.052 0.032 0.438 0.486 0.076
Note: P-Value in parenthesis; Definitions of Variables are expressed in the appendix. cross-section regression using all
countries with data available.
Table 17 : Regressions of Residuals of Private Credit after controlling for Hard
Currency
HC WHC FHC FHC_OW CRHC
-0.64 -0.77 -0.70 -0.605 -1.81
Constant (0.119) (0.060) (0.007) (0.012) (0.147)
-0.0003 -0.0003 0.01 0.006 0.02 Inflation
Average (0.294) (0.296) (0.000) (0.037) (0.001)
1.30E-06 1.25E-06 0.01 0.006 0.02 Interest Rate
Average (0.0002) (0.000) (0.023) (0.225) (0.393)
-0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.003 -0.01 Inflation
Volatility (0.044) (0.048) (0.0001) (0.025) (0.000)
-0.03 -0.022 -0.03 Interest Rate
Volatility (0.022) (0.034) (0.082)
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.007 0.02
Openness (0.189) (0.214) (0.013) (0.010) (0.330)
6.68E-05 7.10E-05 1.28E-05 5.14E-05 6.70E-05
GDP (0.010) (0.011) (0.339) (0.081) (0.143)
R-Square 0.127 0.131 0.449 0.220 0.249
Note: P-Value in parenthesis; Definitions of Variables are expressed in the appendix. Cross-Section regression
using all countries with data available.29
IX. Conclusions
This paper investigated the relationship between hard currency and financial
development. There were several issues to consider. First, it is not straightforward to define
hard currency. A reasonable effort was made in this paper to create empirical counterparts of
theoretical definitions of hard currency. The paper creates four different definitions of hard
currency based on different sets of data. These are series that could be potentially used in
other work. The series created cast doubts about interpretations that equate financial
development to the hardness of the currencies since they are indeed quite different variables.
Moreover, and perhaps a bit surprising, the results of the paper are extremely robust to the
hard currency definition used.
A second issue is the problem of endogenous variables. In order to overcome the
problem we performed exercises in the extreme cases and qualified our conclusions based on
these results. First, we gave financial development the highest chance to explain as much as
possible of the hard currency indices. We took the residuals from those regressions and
verified the remaining explanatory power of the other macro variables. As it was argued in the
text the coefficients in these regressions are similar to the ones obtained when the first step
was not performed. Second, we gave the macro variables the best chance to explain the index.
When we correlated the residuals of these regressions using the financial development
measure we found no relationship. Finally we run the pooled regressions and indicate that
financial development is insignificant to explain hard currency, once other macro variables are
taken into account. In other words, it is possible to argue that the correlation between financial
development and hard currency is due to the fact macroeconomic stability is associated with
both and not because of any direct effect of financial development on the hardness of the
currency.
It is often argued that establishing a hard is a pre-condition for financial development
and all the benefits that it generates. In the limit countries unable to establish their own stable
currencies should dollarize their economies. The results of the paper suggest that indeed
financial development and the hardness of currencies are highly correlated. However, we
found that the relationship from the hardness to financial sector is fully captured by macro30
variables that represent overall macroeconomic stability.  Therefore, if the currency regime
has a bear on the development of the financial sector (and therefore on productivity and
growth) it passes through establishing a stable macroeconomic environment (measured for
example by low and stable inflation and real interest rates). The results also suggest that
having a hard currency is not a pre-condition for financial development but rather establishing
a macroeconomic stable environment, which in principle could be established independent of
the exchange regime.X. References
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XI. Appendix
Appendix A: Definition of variables used in the regressions:
All the variables (except when explicitly indicated) were constructed using raw IFS data
covering the period 1989-1998 in an annual basis.
• Inflation (inflation_av): Average inflation.
• Inflation volatility (inflation_sd): Standard deviation of inflation.
• Real interest rates (interest_av): Average real interest rate.
• Real interest rates volatility (interest_sd): Standard deviation of real interest rates.
• Openness (open): Average of export plus imports as a proportion of GDP.
• GDP per capita (gdp): Average of GDP per capita.
• Private Credit / M1 (cpriv_m1): (Private credit / M1) * (Total credit / GDP).
• Total Credit / M1 (ctotal_m1): (Total credit / M1) * (Total credit / GDP).
• Long -Term Credit / M1: (M2 / M1) * (Total credit / GDP).
• Lc_posit: Domestic currency lending by foreign banks as a proportion of GDP. Source:
BIS.
• Tot_posit: Total cross-border lending as a proportion of GDP. Source: BIS.
Measures of Hard Currency:
• SHC (Strong definition of Hard Currency): See description on page 6.
• WHC (Weak definition of Hard Currency): See description on page 11.
• FHC (Financial definition of Hard Currency): See description on pages 13-14.
• FHC_OW (Financial definition of Hard Currency - Optimal weights): See description on
pages 13-14.
• CRHC_short (Credit rating definition of Hard Currency - Short-term): See description on
page 15.




HC W_HC FHC FHC_OW CR_HC
ALBANIA 0 0.00
ALGERIA 0 0.01 0.00
ANGOLA 0 0.00
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 0 0.00
ARGENTINA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82
ARMENIA 0 0.00
ARUBA 0 0.29
AUSTRALIA 0 0.03 0.91
AUSTRIA 0 0.63 1.00
AZERBAIJAN 0 0.03
BAHAMAS, THE 0 0.00
BANGLADESH 0 0.00 0.05 0.00
BARBADOS 0 0.00 0.03 0.13
BELARUS 0 0.00
BELGIUM 1 0.57 0.96
BELIZE 0 0.00 0.02 0.00
BENIN 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
BHUTAN 0 0.00
BOLIVIA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85
BOTSWANA 0 0.00 0.03 0.00
BRAZIL 0 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.81
BULGARIA 0 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.69
BURKINA FASO 0 0.00
BURUNDI 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAMBODIA 0 0.00
CAMEROON 0 0.00
CANADA 0 0.07 0.97
CAPE VERDE 0 0.01
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. 0 0.00
CHAD 0 0.00
CHILE 0 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.74
CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG 0 0.00 0.95
COLOMBIA 0 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.75
CONGO, DEM. REP. OF 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92
COSTA RICA 0 0.00
COTE D IVOIRE 0 0.00 0.85
CROATIA 0 0.45 0.91
CYPRUS 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85
DENMARK 0 0.73 0.95
DOMINICA 0 0.00 0.02 0.00
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83
ECUADOR 0 0.00 0.00 0.0035
Table  A1- Cont.
HC W_HC FHC FHC_OW CR_HC
EGYPT 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82
EL SALVADOR 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 0 0.00
ESTONIA 0 0.00 0.94
ETHIOPIA 0 0.00
FIJI 0 0.00 0.01 0.00
FINLAND 0 0.07 0.95
FRANCE 1 0.93 0.74 0.00 1.00
GABON 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
GAMBIA, THE 0 0.00
GERMANY 1 0.87 0.81 0.71 1.00
GHANA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
GREECE 0 0.00 0.83
GRENADA 0 0.15 0.39 0.00
GUATEMALA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUINEA-BISSAU 0 0.00
GUYANA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
HAITI 0 0.01 0.00
HONDURAS 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
HUNGARY 0 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.78
ICELAND 0 0.00 0.85
INDIA 0 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.84
INDONESIA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90
IRAN, I.R. OF 0 0.01 0.00
IRELAND 0 0.04 0.91
ISRAEL 0 0.00 0.80
ITALY 1 0.46 0.94
JAMAICA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
JAPAN 1 1.00 0.99 0.64 1.00
JORDAN 0 0.00 0.77
KENYA 0 0.00
KOREA 0 0.01 1.17
KUWAIT 0 0.00 0.95
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 0 0.01
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.REP 0 0.01
LATVIA 0 0.01 0.00 0.88




LITHUANIA 0 0.00 0.88
LUXEMBOURG 0 0.57 1.00
MACEDONIA, FYR 0 0.00
MADAGASCAR 0 0.00
MALAWI 0 0.00
MALAYSIA 0 0.04 0.00 0.83
MALDIVES 0 0.00
MALI 0 0.00
MALTA 0 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.8536
Table  A1-Cont.
HC W_HC FHC FHC_OW CR_HC
MAURITANIA 0 0.00 0.01 -0.05
MAURITIUS 0 0.00
MEXICO 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71
MOLDOVA 0 0.00
MONGOLIA 0 0.00
MOROCCO 0 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.80
MOZAMBIQUE 0 0.01 0.00
MYANMAR 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAMIBIA 0 0.00
NEPAL 0 0.00
NETHERLANDS 1 0.17 1.00
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 0 0.07
NEW ZEALAND 0 0.07 0.91
NICARAGUA 0 0.00
NIGER 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
NIGERIA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
NORWAY 0 0.23 1.00
OMAN 0 0.00
PAKISTAN 0 0.00 0.04 0.00
PANAMA 0 0.00 1.00
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 0 0.00 0.00 -0.34
PARAGUAY 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
PERU 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.09
PHILIPPINES 0 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.75
POLAND 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79
PORTUGAL 0 0.00 0.87
QATAR 0 0.02




SAUDI ARABIA 0 0.01
SENEGAL 0 0.00
SEYCHELLES 0 0.00
SIERRA LEONE 0 0.00
SINGAPORE 0 0.10 0.97
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 0 0.00 0.75
SLOVENIA 0 0.00 0.86
SOLOMON ISLANDS 0 0.00
SOUTH AFRICA 0 0.00 0.80
SPAIN 0 0.01 0.92
SRI LANKA 0 0.00
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 0 0.00
ST. LUCIA 0 0.00 0.03 0.00




SWEDEN 0 0.00 0.9737
Table  A1 – Cont.
HC W_HC FHC FHC_OW CR_HC
SWITZERLAND 1 0.99 1.00
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 0 0.01
TANZANIA 0 0.00
THAILAND 0 0.03 0.90
TOGO 0 0.00
TONGA 0 0.00
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 0 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.81
TUNISIA 0 0.07 0.00 0.78
TURKEY 0 0.01 0.03 0.00
UGANDA 0 0.00
UKRAINE 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 0 0.02
UNITED KINGDOM 1 0.28 1.00
UNITED STATES 1 0.97 1.00
URUGUAY 0 0.00 0.86
VANUATU 0 0.00
VENEZUELA 0 0.00
YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF 0 0.00
ZAMBIA 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
ZIMBABWE 0 0.00 0.00 0.00